Comparative Civilizations Review
Volume 8
Number 8 Spring 1982

Article 3

4-1-1982

The Moralities of Thought and Logics of Action
Benjamin Nelson

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr

Recommended Citation
Nelson, Benjamin (1982) "The Moralities of Thought and Logics of Action," Comparative Civilizations
Review: Vol. 8 : No. 8 , Article 3.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol8/iss8/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Comparative Civilizations Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive. For
more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

Nelson: The Moralities of Thought and Logics of Action

THE MORALITIES OF THOUGHT
AND THE LOGICS OF ACTION:
SOME REFLECTIONS ON HISTORIC
GRAMMARS OF MORAL DECISION
Benjamin Nelson
Dr. Bruce Raup's remarks constitute one of the most notable recent
efforts to think through the problems of what I would like to call the
multi-dimensional logic of moral decision. It hardly needs saying that
Dr. Raup is not simply content to beseech us, in the manner of " o l d
fashioned" moralists, to edify our spirits by fixing our minds upon "nobler" realms. Nor does he—I shall make more of this later—merely ask
us, as latter-day philosophers are wont to do, to adopt a new posture to
the semantics of ethical analysis. Rather, Dr. Raup appears to be striving to set in motion a continuing social effort to evolve a comprehensive
fabric of attitudes and methods in virtue of which moral decision,
whether personal or social, might become increasingly permeated by
rational deliberation and uncoerced consensus. This is what I take him
to mean when he calls for the development of "communities of persuasion."
The conviction lying behind Dr. Raup's appeal seems to me to have
been rarely expressed in more felicitious language than it was by Jean
Piaget, whose name occurs inevitably in the present setting. Toward the
close of his masterly The Moral Judgment of the Child—a work with
whose argument Dr. Raup's views seem to me to have great affinity—the
brilliant Swiss educator and philosopher declares: " L O G I C IS T H E
M O R A L I T Y OF T H O U G H T . . . ; M O R A L I T Y . . . , THE LOGIC
OF A C T I O N . " My effort to express my response to Dr. Raup's challenge will take the form of an attempt to explicate some of the notions
which are suggested to me by this profound maxim.
A number of preliminary considerations and questions occur irresistibly to one affected, as I have admitted to being, with the historian's
This statement was originally written in 1950 and circulated in 1951 to colleagues and students in Minneapolis, Minnesota. It is an expansion of the remarks by Dr. Nelson at a panel discussion of the Conference on Contemporary
Philosophies of Education, University of Minnesota, November 17-18, 1950.
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bias. First: Is it true that we are in dire necessity of what I have chosen
to call a multidimensional logic of moral decision? To this question I
can see only one answer: Yes! Secondly: Can it be that there does not lie
to hand a systematic structure of perspectives and reasonings on the
conduct of the moral life in the writings of professional ethicists and
social scientists? At the risk of compounding my apparent dogmatism, I
will answer the second question just as flatly as I did the first: No! No
satisfactory structure is now available. Indeed, we do not even command a plausible dialectic of concepts from which any such structure
can take its point of departure.
The area of analysis and endeavor to which Dr. Raup directs our
attention is, in the present hour, indeed has been for close to a century, a
sort of no man's land. Where, let one ask, are issues of this sort dealt
with in the university curricula? It would be folly to answer, as some
might on first thought be disposed to do: in the courses on ethics in
departments of philosophy; or, in the serried array of offerings in the
several departments (economics, political science, sociology, anthropology. . .) which now constitute the so-called social sciences. Anyone
who has ever made the acquaintance of these programs will not fail to
recall or observe that ethics as now constituted is principally a logical
analysis of the words " g o o d " and "right"—or, to speak more accurately in the dominant philosophical fashion, an analysis of the "current
uses" of the words " g o o d " and " r i g h t " . Such discussions are probably
indispensable—may well be the prelude—to any rational organization of
the moral life, but it is very doubtful that inevitably and professedly
incomplete semantical analyses of the " g o o d " and " r i g h t " exhaust
the tasks of philosophical morality. Such discussions are only a thread
in any properly conceived fabric of moral philosophy.
It is, indeed, only in our own day that men appear to have lost sight of
this fact. Let anyone review the history of moral philosophy from the
time of the Greeks to the present and he will recognize this fact quickly
enough. The work now most celebrated in "advanced" circles as the
last word in the logical analysis of ethics is that of Professor Charles
Stevenson, Ethics and Language. How different in scope and method,
to say nothing of tone, is this essay from the structure of moral philosophy as conceived from the time of Socrates to the middle of the nineteenth century?
Some among you may be disposed to counter: The issues which were
once assigned to moral philosophy are now, quite properly, reserved for
spccial treatment by the social sciences. To this claim I must enter a
demurrer. Once, it is true, the several social sciences constituted parts
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of a matrix known as moral philosophy (or theology); today, that connection has been entirely forgotten except by antiquarians and unregenerate Oxford dons. Who would now think of calling the social sciences
"moral sciences"? The "social sciences" are replacing the "moral sciences" even in the leading English universities. In our land the disengagement of these "social sciences" from the original matrix of moral
philosophy was completed, at least in the pace-setting institutions, by
the dawn of the present century.
Today the social scientists have little desire to return to the confines
from which they have escaped. Rather, they pride themselves on their
neutrality and moral detachment. Speaking now as a social scientist—
for I have been serving as a journeyman in this area for a goodly number
of years now—I fully understand the grounds for the original demand of
the social sciences to be freed from tutelage to theological orthodoxy
and I support their defense in the present hour against ill-conceived
criticisms of their legitimate claims and contributions. Yet, however
worthy the original and current demands of these disciplines for autonomy, it has become increasingly evident that the resultant atomization
of the sciences (and, one might add, the humanities) is now greatly
retarding men's capacities both to comprehend their predicaments and
their opportunities and to promote the life of reason in society. Indeed,
few persons currently appeal more strenuously for greater integration of
the disciplines than leaders in the various social science professions. It
has become apparent to them that atomization must be corrected in
some fashion at once. Else, the atomized specialists will have, perhaps
forever, to abandon the hope which spurred the individual disciplines to
their original declarations of independence—a hope still vital, but now
drawing each successive breath with greater difficulty—that there might
some day be an integrated science of society.
I

It may help to put my central point in old fashioned terms. Once upon
a time—it was really not so long ago as historians compute time—moral
philosophy ultimately received embodiment in treatises of conscience
and its cases. De conscientia et eius casibus—such was the title of the
work of William Ames, which next to the Bible was the book of life for
the Puritan Fathers of this country. We need not go farther back than the
Middle Ages to achieve due perspective. Speaking roughly, the fashioning of a systematic logic of moral decision may be said to have begun
with Abelard's insistence on the significance of conscience. Before
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long, Abelard's rudimentary analysis of the problematics of moral
agency had flowered into a vast literature, both theoretical and practical
in character. The conscience seeking to become effective in the midst of
moral ambiguities in respect to the cases men actually confronted in the
here-now inevitably generated a casuistry. It was this resourceful association of conscience and casuistry which was the summit of the medieval achievement in the logic of moral decision.
It was this association, we shall soon see, which horrified the early
Protestant Reformers and it was this association which was eventually
sundered in the development of Protestantism. Ames's treatise, to
which we have just made reference was, indeed, not a vigorous expression of a tendency native to Protestantism, but a belated and vestigial
reminiscence of an older day. In truth, the historic association of conscience and casuistry had generally come to be viewed as pernicious to
the cause both of religion and morality well before the death of Ames.
The dissociation of conscience and casuistry occurred in a number of
stages. First, with the Protestant Reformation, the conscience hitherto
thought of as the "proximate (not ultimate) rule of right reason" in
moral (not theological) affairs came to be applied quintessential^ to the
religious sphere, from which it had excluded itself or been excluded in
the Middle Ages. This striking expansion in the claims to competence
of the free conscience, coupled with the deepened antagonism to the
claims of casuistry, had effects upon the making of the modern mind
and the modern world which were as ambiguous as they were profound.
As a result of the growing conviction in the inerrancy of the liberated
and illumined conscience, conscience came to have almost unlimited
range and unchallenged authority. This was especially true among the
left-wing sectaries of the Reformation. To their outlook, it happens, we
owe the growth of many of our most precious liberties. Their appeals to
the rights of the free conscience lie behind the establishment of the
"inalienable" freedoms claimed today, the freedoms of thought and
worship, of speech and press, of assembly and association and others
hardly needing to be recalled. The less desirable accompanimentsshall we call them the unintended by-products?—of the new role
adopted by conscience have not been so well perceived. By an almost
paradoxical reversal, the invasion by conscience of the once privileged
sphere of faith was not purchased without a price: the abandonment by
conscience of interest in and competence over the governance of moral
and social life. The identification of conscience with faith and worship
saw the surrender by conscience of its age-old claims to propose courses
of action for the conduct of man's mter-personal relations as fellow
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members in their several and joint undertakings in the economy, society, and polity.
In short: the privatization of the conscience—the dissociation of conscience from its cases, the dissociation of moral effort from the ambiguous contingencies of the here-now resulted inevitably from its initial
preoccupation with and subsequent confinement to individual religious
faith. To many, of course, this dissociation was a blessed consummation. Conscience appeared to now be purged of the dross which had
attached to it so long as it took shape in a "hair-splitting chicanery"
which seemed to serve no better purpose than to promote the evil designs of an established church. A liberated conscience free of the constraints of "priestcraft", free of the stigma of the confessional—a conscience without casuistry!—this was the goal of man's strivings. Only
then, it was supposed, could each man live his own moral life in response to the promptings of the inner light.
Before too long, however, the liberated conscience itself was under
attack. Its increasing disrepute in advanced circles was already evident
to many in the course of the seventeenth century. In the nineteenth
century the progress of rational science, evolutionary biology, anthropological exploration, seemed inevitably to doom the idea of conscience
and its neighboring notion, with which it was often confused, the
"moral sense." It was not, however, until our own (enlightened) time
that the notion of conscience was to undergo its nadir. Today, the conscience is denounced as the prime vestige of the sense of guilt, the builtin ("introjected") censor forced upon men by group repression—the bar
to free expression of impulse—the enemy within the gates.
These vicissitudes of conscience—first the abandonment of its link
with casuistry, then the privatization of its sphere of action, finally the
denial of its authenticity and its autonomy—were not the only sources of
the dissociation between conscience and casuistry. Other forces were no
less effective. The complex issues which arose in the consideration of
the cases of conscience came, as time passed, to require exhaustive
treatment in their own terms. At first, it was supposed that such treatment would greatly assist in cueing intelligent decisions as to moral
alternatives. Finally, the cases came to be studied not only in their own
terms, but for their own sake, for the sake of science itself. Thus the
several spheres in which these issues seemed to classify themselves hastened to shake free from the matrix of moral philosophy in which they
had been originally embraced. The increase in autonomy from surveillance of all those once coordinated sciences was imperceptibly but inevitably accompanied by the increasing isolation of one science from an-
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other. Some aspects of the preliminary phases of the growth of
autonomous disciplines in the early modern era have been movingly
described in the writings of Mr. R. H. Tawney. The newer developments in the dissociation which waited until the nineteenth century have
yet to find their historian.
In my terms, Dr. Raup is asking us to re-integrate the study of conscience and its cases. To this request I give echo with all the power at
my command. It is exactly the approach I have been advocating whenever the opportunity has presented itself. Indeed, this re-examination of
the interrelations of conscience and casuistry constitutes the core of my
current researches on the evolution of the logic(s) of moral decision in
the West. Such attempts at re-integration appear to me to be the necessary prelude to any reconstructing of humanistic perspectives upon the
moral life. There is great reason to hope that this undertaking will not be
without fruit. Our day is witnessing the one effective assault on the
perverse over-specialization which marked the "machine a g e " in a
neighboring science, or, if you prefer, art. I refer to the progress of the
psychosomatic outlook in medicine. Analogously, the re-integration of
the study of conscience and its cases will generate frameworks of understanding which promise to be as productive for exploring the pathology
and proposed remedies for moral confusion and social disorganization
as psychosomatic medicine is proving in clarifying the diagnoses and
cures of once obscure or imperfectly defined syndromes.
II
Perhaps it will be clear now why I was particularly impressed by Dr.
Raup's allusion yesterday afternoon to the relations between man's efforts to achieve rational uncoerced consensus in the moral sphere with
the workings of the judicial process. In older days—again I must add:
not so long ago as historians compute time—jurisprudence was barely
distinguishable from moral philosophy. This was not because, as so
many voices are now claiming, there was a universally received doctrine of the natural law. It was simply because the work of the law in
vindicating right and promoting justice was felt to be moral through and
through, the most comprehensive effort made within society to apply
reason and reasonableness in the reconciliation of individual purposes
and social goals. It is not being claimed that moral philosophers and
jurists did not equally tug at the reins which held them in harness. Both
aspects of the matter can be readily grasped if we think of the work of
two men: the one, Justice Holmes, about whom we spoke yesterday; the
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other, Martin Luther, whose career will perhaps be more or less easily
recalled in these parts.
Justice Holmes, speaking as a jurist, had a horror of the anarchism
which appeared inevitably, in his judgment, to be introduced into the
law by its confusion with moral philosophy. In this attitude, he was of
course one with many other jurists before and after who prefer the
"minimum" but seemingly definite morality embodied in the law to the
"maximum" but apparently arbitrary or capricious morality expressed
in ethics of intention or in what has come to be called "cadi "justice.
Luther, on the other hand, it will be remembered, had a horror of
confusing religion with legalism. One who believed in justification by
faith alone, as he did, could only be enraged at the presumptions involved in the codification of the moral life in the form of precepts. It is
no accident that the decisive stages in Luther's assumption of his career
as a reformer are associated with his casting into the flames of the Corpus iuris canonici, the codification of the laws of the medieval church,
and the Summa angelica de casibus of Angelus de Clavasio, the most
popular manual of moral theology and guide to the cases of conscience
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. If, therefore, Justice
Holmes, speaking in the name of the legal profession, rejected transcendental ethics in the name of law, Luther rejected law and moral casuistry in the name of religion and the free conscience.
It is my profound conviction that some separation between law and
moral philosophy is both inevitable and necessary. I will not indulge
myself in the luxury of going into details on this point, save to suggest
that the effort to identify the two leads easily to unwanted authoritarianism. Yet, I would insist, the complete divorce of the various realms
from one another has results hardly less fatal than authoritarianism. If
the confusion of religion with morals runs the risk of Pharisaism, the
divorce of religion from morals surely deprives religion of the opportunity of temporal fulfillment and robs morals of the stimulus of a transcendental perspective. True, the identification of law with morals leads
easily to unwanted authoritarianism, but the isolation of law from morals leaves law no recourse but to become fiat and dooms morals to go
without public embodiment.
We must, therefore, set about reviewing old and exploring new ways
of integrating conscience and its cases. If this is what Dr. Raup means—
and I think this is what he must mean—then I agree with him. It hardly
needs saying that in these projected re-integrations, ingenious and informed use will have to be made of the truly productive contributions,
however technical their expression, of the sciences and the humanities.
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I oppose the view that the social sciences need to be yoked into a unity
which they do not desire and which, if unintelligently effected, would
surely threaten their creative existence.
Rather, I urge that all men who seek to enhance the measure of humane value in this imperfect world need to be alerted to the opportunities which lie to hand in the construction of two-way thoroughfares from
a revitalized moral philosophy to social science and from a revitalized
social science to moral philosophy. Indeed, before we had gone very far
in the attempt to meet Dr. Raup's challenge, we should discover the
need for the formation of a new profession. I refer to a gathering of all
those, not only professional educators, who would dedicate themselves
to the building of such bridges between the sciences, the humanities,
and the moral life; who would without cease seek to improve the understanding of the logics of moral decision and to quicken the disposition
both to rational analysis and moral activity. The motto of such a profession might well be the maxim with which this discussion began:
" L O G I C IS T H E M O R A L I T Y OF T H O U G H T ; M O R A L I T Y T H E
LOGIC OF A C T I O N . "
Some among you may be concluding that I must be a victim of Utopian illusions. Let me, therefore, quickly enter a strong caveat against
any such interpretation of my views. I do not anticipate that these proposed re-integrations will effect the total and final deliverance of moral
men from the labyrinth in which they now—and always—find themselves. Those who devote themselves to living a moral life and who take
occasion to reflect on their own successes and failures in meeting their
moral opportunities will not need to be reminded of how winding is the
road and how many are the ambiguities which lurk at every turn.
Let me only mention, in concluding, three ambiguities which struck
me as I listened to Dr. Raup's exposition. (I must add that I do not
pretend that I see how to resolve these dilemmas:)
1) The ambiguity which lurked in the allusion to Justice Holmes and
the moral enterprise. I offered some clues on this score yesterday afternoon. Now I will show my hand without reserve. It would be wonderful
if we were in a position in moral affairs to emulate the workings of the
judicial process. It is my conviction that a great quickening both of
moral philosophy and the social sciences would come from a careful
scrutiny of the processes of collective decision-making in the law. Yet,
there is one catch in this analogy. The "formally peaceful", as Max
Weber would say, reconciliation of claims, can occur in the law, because the rules applied in the law or the rulers who apply the law can
claim or possess an authority or power which is not generally or easily
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put in question. In such a setting, the judicial process acts as a form of
social invention in which new claims are reconciled with old expectations through the subtle devices of a casuistry. The judicial process
proves to be mediatorial in its nature and it makes its greatest contribution when it effects innovation without outraging tradition. The social
and moral understandings by which the group symbolizes its quest for
continuity are constantly being rethreaded by the loom of the law. Sophisticated representatives of the bar may tell us that decisions by the
bench are no better than arbitrary dictates of the judges, that the courts
simply choose or create one of many possible chains of precedent. That
judges will innovate is inevitable and desirable—if the character of their
work of innovation be rightly understood. What these latter-day thinkers have yet to demonstrate is that the courts, as we know them, feel
free to abandon the pretence of following chains of precedent, to declare
law without reference to the judicial tradition.
The judicial process is conservative in the best sense of that term. It is
society's most comprehensive attempt to achieve orderly resolutions of
the conflicts which inevitably, I think, occur among men over the management and distribution of scarce values—I do not mean only or peculiarly "economic" values. The point of view of the judicial process
embraces many dimensions of time and value, is directed toward the
culture's durational manifold, the communities' continuing history
through time. If I may adapt some happy phrases of my colleague,
Professor Norman De Witt, the outlook of the law is not only
punctual—that is, addressed to the immediate, the passing present—it
must be retrospective and prospective, as well. It must, in other words,
be durative. (An earlier version of these distinctions appears in T. H.
Gaster's Thespis, 1949).
Why does the moral life not develop in the same way? Why do men
not today resolve their moral disagreements through these ordered and
orderly processes of judicial decision? The reasons are too many and
complex to explore here. I wish only to mention one. Some moral disagreements either are or seem to be fundamental differences in the very
scaling of values. When men clash over fundamental orientations, when
they recognize no authority, no power, no legal processes, no dialectic
of moral decision to which they commonly give allegiance, their differences cannot be adroitly reconciled. Knowing no common law, their
clash may call forth weapons more lethal than the arguments of rival
attorneys.
2) The second ambiguity I seem to feel in Dr. Raup's remarks relates to the conviction that the extension of the channels of communica-
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tion will surely yield fuller and deeper communication. The increase in
the area of communication is surely a necessary—but it is not a sufficient prerequisite in the achievement of community. When the matter of
communication is regarded in the light of the workaday world, as is not
sufficiently done in the notable pages of Dewey's The Public and its
Problems, from which Dr. Raup's discussion seems to take its point of
departure, it becomes apparent that communication, especially in the
way it functions in our mass society, gives the semblance but not the
reality of community. This leads to my final remark.
3) It is sometimes supposed that the achievement of the moral community will come when right is vindicated against might, when right is
vindicated against wrong. The moral life would be easier to live and the
moral community easier to achieve if the conflicts could be so easily
defined and explained. We must never allow ourselves to forget that
many of the most distressing and tangled conflicts in the moral life
occur when " r i g h t " is pitted against " r i g h t " . In what court shall one
decide the conflicts among men over the very principles by which the
entire structure of society ought to be organized?
Here, for the last time, I will be permitted to make an allusion to
some of my own researches. Many of the most sanguine battles in the
history of men have been fought over the interpretations to be given to
ideals which men have claimed to hold in common. Let him who may
doubt this survey the historical record on the internecine conflicts which
have raged in the name of liberty, equality, and fraternity. In an essay of
mine published recently. The Idea of Usury (1949), I have taken occasion to emphasize the contrasting meanings assigned in the history of
the Christian West to the Jewish and Christian ideals of brotherhood.
The subtitle I gave this essay, "From Tribal Brotherhood to Universal
Otherhood," may serve to introduce my closing observation. The different contents with which different individuals and groups have invested the same ideal—perhaps we should simply say the same w o r d are rarely distinguished with proper shadings. In the hope of making the
shadings in the contrasting terms clearer, I resorted to a rarely successful expedient, the coining of a new term, the awkward word Otherhood.
I would reserve the term "Universal Brotherhood" for a moral (as
distinguished from a merely spatial) community in which all men are
associated by the closest of bonds, as, say, brothers are assumed to be in
a family. If the bond serves to unite only a portion of mankind and to
exclude others as enemy aliens or unloved outsiders, I would use the
term " T r i b a l Brotherhood." I introduce the term " U n i v e r s a l
Otherhood" to describe a form of brotherhood which many in this
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country and elsewhere regularly confuse with Universal Brotherhood.
By "Universal Otherhood" I mean a brotherhood in which all men are
brothers in being equally others. The element of Brotherhood in this
form of association, it may be noted, consists in the fact that men view
one another as equally rather than differentially others.
How, say, shall the issues between these different versions of
brotherhood—how, say, shall the issues between the different versions,
now current, of democracy be resolved in the courts? Will education
and communication suffice in our time to heal the breach? I hope for the
best but I fear the worst.
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